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Abstract 
 
A considerable amount of academic research on 
crowdfunding has highlighted the importance of online 
social networks to crowdfunding success. Despite 
findings from these early studies, the focus of the extant 
literature has been on more persistent state-type ties 
such as friendship. In the current research, we examine 
how borrower-partner and borrower-team event-type 
ties affect lender behavior and loan success in online 
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. Our empirical results using 
a multilevel mixed effects model reveal that borrower-
team networks function as pipes that facilitate the flow 
of information and prospective lenders while borrower-
partner ties function as prisms that signal borrowers’ 
pressing financial need.  Our results highlight the 
importance of establishing lending teams on 
crowdfunding platforms to enhance lender contribution. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the last decade, crowdfunding has become a 
popular mechanism through which individuals and 
business can obtain donations for significant life 
changing events such as medical treatments and 
education, borrow money from other lenders, and 
bypass investors and the financial markets to obtain 
funds to support their start-up activities and continued 
growth. Among the different crowdfunding business 
models, online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending that allows 
individuals to lend and borrow money from each other 
has taken center stage. Research on P2P lending has 
examined how borrowers’ project descriptions, category 
spanning and lenders’ herding behavior affect 
fundraising success [1-3].  
The extant crowdfunding literature highlights the 
importance of social capital and social networks to 
fundraising success across multiple crowdfunding 
business models [4-7].  Despite the significance of such 
social capital and social networks, there exists two gaps 
in research. First, current studies have focused on state- 
 
 
 
type social networks of more permanent relationships 
such as friendship [8]. Few have examined the impacts  
of event-type social networks that arise due to business 
transactions.  To the best of our knowledge, the only 
exceptions are Colombo et al. [7] and Wang et al. [9] 
where they examine social capital and social networks 
emerged due to transactions on crowdfunding 
platforms. Second, no research except for Liu et al. [4] 
has examined the different mechanisms through which 
social networks affect lender behavior.  
In the current study, we examine different types of 
social networks on Kiva.org, a leading P2P lending 
website, where organizations called field partners can 
review loan applications from borrowers and then post 
approved applications on Kiva. This process creates a 
tie between the borrower and the field partner that is 
specific to the particular loan transaction. In addition, 
lenders on Kiva can form lending teams based on shared 
interest, geography, or school and employer affiliation, 
and lenders from the same team can share information 
on the loans they have contributed to. Each loan’s 
fundraising page also displays its lending teams. This 
creates a second event-based tie between the 
borrower(s) and a lending team. In the current study, we 
investigate how these two event-type social ties function 
differently as either signals of loan quality or channels 
through which prospective lenders learn about a loan.  
Results from our empirical research using a multilevel 
mixed effects model reveal that indeed these two types 
of social networks affect lender decision making and 
crowdfunding success differently. Specifically, ties 
between borrowers and their contributing teams 
function as pipes that raise awareness about a particular 
loan and facilitate the flow of prospective lenders to a 
loan’s page. As a result, borrowers with more 
contributing teams receive more funding in the next 
period. In contrast, ties between borrowers and their 
field partners are prisms that convey information about 
the borrowers’ financial need, and borrowers with a 
higher risk field partner are perceived more favorably 
by Kiva lenders and receive more contribution. Our 
results highlight the altruistic motivation behind Kiva 
lenders’ decisions as they do not receive any interest rate 
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on their loans to the borrowers and face the risk of not 
being able to obtain repayment on their loans. These 
results have implications to both P2P lending platforms 
and donation-based crowdfunding websites such as 
GoFundMe where crowdfunding participants donate to 
others in need for altruistic purposes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1. Crowdfunding 
  
Academic research on crowdfunding has examined 
factors that affect crowdfunding success at both the 
platform and the project levels. At the platform level, 
Jiang et al. [10] identified investors’ herding behavior in 
their choice of crowdfunding platforms and revealed 
how such behaviors are moderated by the platform’s 
market share, cumulative amount funded, and time in 
operation. The majority of the crowdfunding research 
focuses on the project level, where researchers have 
examined how characteristics of the borrowers and 
projects, similarity between the borrowers and lenders, 
group leader behavior and social networks affect project 
performance [2, 3, 5, 6, 11-14].   
In P2P lending, because of the information 
asymmetry between the participants, borrowers and 
lenders often use signals to indicate and infer loan 
quality and make lending decisions. For example, 
project narratives that signal autonomy, competitive 
aggressiveness and risk-taking lead to more funding 
success while language that signals conscientiousness, 
courage, empathy and warmth are less favored by 
lenders [15]. In addition, lenders exhibit rational herding 
and infer signals of poor borrower quality as better 
creditworthiness while signals of high borrower quality 
are discounted [2]. However, lenders may also mistake 
group leaders’ bids as signals of a high loan quality [3].  
The extant crowdfunding literature also reveals the 
importance of social capital and social networks to 
crowdfunding success. Colombo et al. [7] showed that 
borrowers’ internal social capital accumulated within a 
crowdfunding platform positively contributes to early 
project success and a higher likelihood of reaching the 
fundraising goal in rewards-based crowdfunding. 
Similarly, external social capital accumulated outside of 
the crowdfunding platform through online and offline 
friend networks leads to more funds received, a higher 
likelihood of reaching the funding goal, and lower 
interest rates in P2P lending [4, 5]. 
Despite the significance of social capital and social 
networks, two gaps in the literature exist. First, there is 
little research that explores the mechanisms through 
which different types of social networks affect lender 
behavior and loan success. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only exception is Liu et al. [4] that 
examined how the borrower’s online and offline friends 
networks and the strength of the friendship ties differ in 
their impacts on lender decisions. Second, the focus of 
the crowdfunding literature has been on friendship 
networks of the borrowers or lenders. In the current 
study, we examine how the borrower-partner and 
borrower-team networks on Kiva, a P2P lending 
website, function differently in affecting loan success.   
 
2.2. Social networks as pipes and prisms 
  
Social networks represent the interactions and 
connections among individuals, entities and events [8]. 
Scholars across many disciplines including sociology, 
management and political science have used social 
network theory (SNT) to examine the formation of ties 
among individuals and entities, how the strength of 
these ties affect the flow of information and resources in 
a network, and how network positions affect individual, 
organizational and political performance and outcomes.  
Information Systems (IS) researchers have also applied 
SNT to the study of open source software development 
[16], information technology outsourcing [17], WOM 
and diffusion of innovation [18], social media user 
behavior [19-21], and crowdfunding [4, 5]. 
According to SNT, there are two types of ties in 
social networks. State-type ties such as kinship ties and 
friendship are more persistent, while event-type ties 
such as business transactions and committee 
membership are based on transactions and social 
interactions and are more discrete and transitory [8]. 
Irrespective of the type, social ties have long been 
recognized as valuable because they represent access to 
information, ideas and resources that flow in the 
network [8]. As a result,  the strength of the ties 
especially the weak ties and the positions of the nodes 
such as structural holes are important determinants of 
how information and resources are shared or diffuse 
across a network [22, 23].  
In a stark contrast to earlier social network research 
that views social ties of all types as roads or pipes 
through which news or resources flow, Podolny [24] 
distinguishes between two types of network ties: those 
as pipes and those as prisms. In the former case, network 
ties function as pipes through which information and 
resources flow, and traditional network theories such as 
the strength of weak ties and structural holes apply. In 
the latter case, social ties do not facilitate the flow of 
information or resources. Rather, they function as 
prisms that differentiate the nodes. Hence, being 
connected to a higher status alter indicates the social 
status of the ego and serves as a signal of trustworthiness 
and credibility. For example, in the organizational 
context, being associated with a high status organization 
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indicates that a firm has obtained the approval of the 
more prominent other [25]. As a result, nodes occupying 
structural holes are not in an advantageous position.  
We apply Podolny’s notion of networks as pipes and 
prisms to examine how two crowdfunding event-type 
ties - those between a borrower and a field partner and 
those between a borrower and a lending team –function 
as pipes and prisms in affecting lender behavior and loan 
success. 
 
3. Background and Hypotheses  
 
3.1. P2P lending on Kiva 
 
As a leading P2P lending platform, Kiva offers 
borrowers from around the world, especially those in 
developing countries, the opportunity to obtain loans 
from lenders. Most Kiva loans involve a field partner, 
very often a microfinance institution that has teamed up 
with Kiva to review borrower applications, pre-disburse 
loans to approved borrowers, post loans on Kiva, and 
collect repayments based on predetermined dates. While 
many field partners collect minimal interest on the loans 
to cover their operational expenses, the lenders do not 
receive interest on their loans. Hence, it is likely that 
lenders do not focus on the time value of money and 
lend for altruistic reasons under the risk of no 
repayment. A loan listing usually lasts up to 30 days or 
until the fundraising goal has been If the fundraising 
goal is not reached at the end of the listing period, the 
lenders get a refund of their contribution. 
In addition to lending to borrowers on Kiva, lenders 
can also join one or more lending teams formed based 
on shared interests and beliefs, geographic proximity, or 
organizational or school affiliation. Each team can have 
one or more captains that manage team message boards 
and activities. As an example, Kiva Christians, one of 
the largest lending teams on Kiva, had three captains 
and over 21,000 members in May 2018 and has 
provided over $45 million in loans since its inception in 
2008. On each team’s webpage, team members’ most 
recent loan activities are listed with hyperlinks to the 
loans. Members can also interact with other team 
members on the team’s message board.  
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
 
The involvement of field partners and the presence 
of lending teams introduce two event-type networks on 
Kiva. First, there is a borrower-partner network when 
borrowers apply for Kiva loans through the field 
partners. This relationship is based on a particular loan 
application and is temporary. Hence, it is an event-type 
tie. Similarly, when one or more lenders in a team lend 
to the borrower(s) of a loan, a tie is created between the 
borrower(s) and the team based on the loan transaction. 
The team is listed under the “Contributing teams” 
section of the loan page, and members of the team can 
view the loan information through a hyperlink posted on 
the team’s homepage. This creates a second event-type 
borrower-team tie based on the lending transactions. In 
the current research, we examine how these two event-
type ties affect prospective lenders’ decision-making 
and the amount of fund a loan is able to accumulate. 
While both networks are event-type networks, the 
mechanisms through which they affect lending behavior 
are different. Field partners review borrowers’ loan 
applications and post approved loans on Kiva. During 
this underwriting and approval process, a field partner 
can screen out risky borrowers. However, the process 
and criteria field partners use to approve loan 
applications are unknown to Kiva lenders. Prospective 
lenders can only rely on the information posted on the 
loan webpage to infer borrowers’ quality. The field 
partner section on a loan’s webpage lists information 
and statistics about the field partner including tenure on 
Kiva, number of borrowers helped, total amount of 
loans raised, overall risk rating, and more specific risk 
indicators such as delinquency rate, default rate, and 
loans at risk rate. Because prospective lenders do not 
have access to all information field partners have on the 
borrower(s) or the processes and criteria the field 
partner used to screen the borrower(s), field partner 
statistics become important prisms that convey 
borrower quality information. Hence, being associated 
with a more experienced field partner with a longer 
tenure, more loans secured for the borrowers, and lower 
risks may serve as status signals of the borrower(s)’ 
credibility and trustworthiness. Prior research suggests 
that status signals very often reduce transaction costs, 
enhance access to financial capital, and improve 
organizational survival [26]. In crowdfunding, 
borrowers and lenders have frequently used signals to 
infer loan quality due to the uncertainty involved [5, 27]. 
For Kiva lenders, the borrower-partner tie may serve as 
a prism that signals the quality of the borrower(s) and 
the likelihood of getting repayment on their loan. 
H1a: A loan with a field partner with longer tenure on 
Kiva is associated with a higher likelihood of 
fundraising success. 
H1b: A loan with a field partner that has raised more 
loans is associated with a higher likelihood of 
fundraising success. 
H1c: A loan with a lower-risk field partner is associated 
with a higher likelihood of fundraising success. 
In contrast to the borrower-partner ties being prisms, 
the borrower-team ties are pipes that channel the flow of 
prospective lenders for three reasons. First, after one or 
more members of a lending team contribute to a loan, a 
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hyperlink to the loan is added to the team activity 
section on the team’s homepage on Kiva. This alerts 
other members of the team about the loan, and they can 
click on the loan’s hyperlink to learn about it. Second, 
because lending teams are very often formed based on 
common lending interests, the likelihood of other team 
members contributing to a loan is higher than that of an 
average lender. Hence, once other members of the team 
become aware of the loan, their likelihood of lending to 
the borrowers is much higher than that of a random 
lender. Third, lenders can interact with others on the 
same team through the team’s message board. This 
provides the members another opportunity to raise 
awareness about the loans they fund and introduce more 
prospective lenders to a listing. The online team forum 
also fosters an online community for team members 
with similar lending interests. Such an online 
community help its members develop a shared identity, 
enhance member commitment, and encourage altruistic 
behaviors [28]. As a result, borrowers with many 
contributing teams, with teams with more members, and 
with more active teams based on recent contributions 
are likely to receive more funding. Hence, we have: 
H2a: A loan with more contributing teams is associated 
with a higher likelihood of fundraising success. 
H2b: A loan with more members in its contributing 
teams is associated with a higher likelihood of 
fundraising success. 
H2c: A loan with teams that have contributed more 
recently is associated with a higher likelihood of 
fundraising success. 
 
4. Data and Methods  
 
4.1. Data 
 
We collected weekly loan data through the Kiva API 
from March to July 2017 using an automated data 
collection agent. Our sample consists of data on 34,771 
loans with a total of 81,146 loan-week pairs. Each loan 
has up to four weekly observations since Kiva loans last 
up to 30 days. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive 
statistics on key loan variables at the end of each listing. 
Table 1. Loan descriptive statistics (N=34,771) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
# of 
borrowers 
2.04 3.14 1 37 
Amount 
raised in USD 
312.05 909.37 0 44475 
# lenders 9.12 22.84 0 1082 
# teams 6.72 9.62 0 373 
 
4.2. Econometric Models 
While there is a screening process by the field 
partner prior to the loan being posted on Kiva, this 
process is exogenous in our research for three reasons. 
First, we focus on prospective lenders’ decision-
making based on loan, field partner and lending team 
information already posted on Kiva and how such 
information affects a loan’s fundraising success. The 
underwriting process that occurs prior to the loan 
posting on Kiva is exogenous to our research. Second, 
Kiva is global and its goal is to reduce poverty. The 
lenders are from developed countries while the 
overwhelming majority of the borrowers are from 
developing countries. Hence, the chance of Kiva 
lenders having private information on the borrowers is 
very low. Third, Kiva lenders do not have access to the 
process or criteria field partners use in their 
underwriting process. Prospective lenders can only rely 
on the information posted on the loan webpage 
including field partner statistics and lending teams to 
make their lending decisions. Hence, we argue that, in 
presence of the unknown underwriting process and 
selection criteria used by the field partners, lenders 
view field partner statistics as prisms that convey 
important information about borrower(s) quality. As a 
result, we do not consider the field partner screening 
process as an endogeneity concern in our research.  
Because we model loan success based on 
borrower(s), field partner and lending team data posted 
on a loan’s webpage, we recognize that not all loans 
received funding and those that received funding did 
not all have lenders as members of lending teams. This 
introduces a selection bias in our data since we have to 
eliminate loans without lending teams, and there may 
be a systematic difference between loans with and 
without lending teams. To correct for this selection 
bias, we first estimate a Heckman [29] selection model 
on the likelihood of a loan having at least one lending 
team. We use the following model to predict the 
probability that a loan had at least one contributing 
team by time t: 
Pr(HadTeamit=1|zit)=Φ(zitβ1 + μi + vt +εit), (1) 
where HadTeamit is a dummy variable indicating if 
Loan i had at least one contributing team by time t, Φ 
denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution, 
and zit is a vector of exogenous variables on loan 
characteristics at time t including the natural logarithm 
of the fundraising goal, the borrower count on the loan, 
the sector of the loan’s intended use, the borrower(s)’ 
country, whether the loan had a field partner, and the 
number of days left in the loan listing. These variables 
are exogenous to the probability of a loan having at least 
one lending team because they are either determined 
prior to the loan being posted on Kiva or they are based 
on time which is not determined by lender behavior. vt 
represents the fixed effects of the week of the data 
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collection. Because of the bias present in fixed effects 
nonlinear models, we estimate a random effects Probit 
model [30]. Loan i’s random effect μi follows a N(0,σμ2) 
distribution. We calculate the inverse Mills ratio based 
on Equation 1 and add it in our second-stage multilevel 
mixed effects model as an explanatory variable. 
Our second stage model involves estimating the loan 
amount a listing received during week t. Because loans 
are nested under the field partners, we use a multilevel 
(a.k.a hierarchical) mixed-effects model with the loan 
being the first level and the field partner being the 
second level. The use of the multilevel model allows us 
to capture systematic variations in the impacts of loan 
and team characteristics among loans sponsored by the 
same field partner [31]. In the first level, we estimate the 
amount of loan a listing received during week t based on 
borrower, loan and team characteristics: 
Level 1 (Loanij): Δyijt= β0j + β1jyijt-1 + β2jDaysLeftijt-1 + 
β3jln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) + β4jln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) + 
β5jln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) + β6IMRijt-1 + vt +εijt, (2) 
where Δyijt represents the natural logarithm of one plus 
the amount of loan listing i sponsored by field partner j 
received during week t (ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1)), yijt-1 is 
the natural logarithm of the total amount of loan listing 
i with field partner j received up until week t-1 plus one 
(ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1)), IMRijt-1 is the inverse Mills ratio 
for listing i at week t-1, and vt is the fixed effects of the 
week of the data collection. εijt is the error term in the 
prediction of the amount of loan a listing received and 
follows a N(0,σε2) distribution. The other variables 
represent the impacts of loan and team characteristics on 
the amount of loan received. Because the number of 
lenders on a loan is highly correlated with the 
cumulative amount raised, we do not include the latter 
in our loan level model. 
Next, we introduce field-partner characteristics in 
our Level 2 model to capture their impacts on loan 
listing success and how the impacts of lending teams 
may differ across loans with different field partners: 
Level 2 (Partnerj): β0j = γ00 + γ01ln(PtrTenurejt-1) + 
γ02ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1) + γ03PtrRatingjt-1 + ξ0j, 
β1j= γ10 + ξ1j, β2j= γ20 + ξ2j, β3j= γ30 + ξ3j, β4j= γ40 + ξ4j, and 
β5j= γ50 + ξ5j. (2) 
Based on these specifications, the intercept β0j in 
Equation 1 is a function of three field partner-related 
variables and a random effect ξ0j. The slopes in Equation 
1 are dependent on a fixed effect (γ) and a field partner-
related random effect (ξ). These random effects are 
assumed to follow normal distributions with a mean of 
zero and their respective variances. By combining 
Equations 1 and 2, we have: 
Δyijt= γ00 +γ01ln(PtrTenurejt-1) +γ02ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1 
+1) + γ03PtrRatingjt-1 + γ10yijt-1 + γ20DaysLeftijt-1 + 
γ30ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) + γ40ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) + 
γ50ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) + β6IMRijt-1 + vi +εit  + 
ξ1jyijt-1 + ξ2jDaysLeftijt-1 + ξ3jln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) + 
ξ4jln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) + ξ5jln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1)  
+ ξ0j. (3) 
In Equation 3, the γ’s are the fixed effects and the ξ’s 
are the random effects. Hence, we have a hierarchical 
mixed-effects model and estimate the coefficients for 
the fixed effects and the variances of the random effects. 
Table 2 summarizes our variable definitions. 
 
Table 2. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
HadTeamit 1 if loan i had at least one contributing team by time t; 0 otherwise. 
ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the contribution amount loan i received during time t. 
ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the total contribution amount loan i received up until 
time t-1. 
ln(LoanGoali+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the fundraising goal of loan i. 
NoBorrowersi The number of borrowers on loan i. 
DummyPtri Dummy variable with the value of 1 if loan i had a field partner; 0 otherwise. 
DaysLeftijt-1 The number of fundraising days remaining at time t for loan i. 
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of contributing teams for loan i posted by 
field partner j during time t-1. 
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of members in loan i’s contributing 
teams at time t-1. 
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the total amount loan i’s contributing teams had lent out 
on Kiva during the month immediately preceding time t-1. 
ln(PtrTenurejt-1) The natural logarithm of the number of days at time t-1 that field partner j had been posting 
loans on Kiva. 
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1+1) The natural logarithm of one plus the total amount field partner j had raised on Kiva up 
until time t-1. 
PtrRatingjt-1 Field partner j’s risk rating given by Kiva at time t-1; ranges from 0 to 5 with 5 being the 
least risky. 
IMR ijt-1 The inverse Mills ratio for loan i from partner j at time t-1. 
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5. Results  
 
In this section, we first report our results of the first 
stage random effects Probit selection model, then we 
report the results of our second stage multilevel mixed-
effects model. 
 
5.1. Random effects Probit selection model 
results 
 
Because we use one-week-lagged loan 
characteristic variables to predict the likelihood that a 
loan had at least one contributing team by time t, our 
sample size reduces to 42,286 loan-week pairs collected 
from 20,250 unique loans. Table 3 summarizes the 
results of our first stage random effects Probit selection 
model. Except for DummyPtr, all other independent 
variables are significant. The results indicate that having 
a higher fundraising goal and more borrowers on the 
loan increased the likelihood of the loan having at least 
one contributing team. In contrast, loans that were early 
in their fundraising process with more days remaining 
were less likely to have a contributing team. Based on 
the estimation model, we calculate the IMR and add it 
to our second stage multilevel mixed-effects model.  
Table 3. Random effects Probit selection model 
results (N=42,286) 
Variable Coefficient  
(Std. Dev.) 
ln(LoanGoali+1) 1.775*** 
(0.074) 
NoBorrowersi 0.179*** 
(0.014) 
DummyPtri 5.968 
(4.746) 
DaysLeftijt-1 -0.458*** 
(0.005) 
Sector Dummies Included 
Country Dummies Included 
Time Dummies Included 
Constant -0.410 
(4.825) 
Wald χ2 18061.89*** 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
5.2. Multilevel mixed-effects model results 
 
Table 4 summarizes our second-stage analysis 
results from multiple models. Model 2A is the baseline 
model without considering the nested field partner 
effect. Models 2B through 2E are multilevel mixed 
effects models that take into account the nested field 
partner effect on loan success. Model 2B includes the 
intercept only. Model 2C includes Level 1 loan fixed 
and random effects only. Model 2D includes Level 2 
field partner and random effects only. Model 2E 
includes fixed and random effects for both the loan and 
field partner variables. Models 2B and 2D have much 
larger sample sizes because there is no selection bias of 
loans with contributing teams. In the other three models, 
we control for this selection bias by including the 
inverse Mills ratio for having a team. All models’ 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are under 5. As a result, 
multicollinearity is not an issue in our data analysis. We 
compare the model goodness of fit using the deviance 
[32, 33]. Because Models 2B and 2D have much larger 
sample sizes, their deviances are much larger. Overall, 
Model 2E with the fixed and random effects of both loan 
and partner level variables has the lowest deviance and 
the best model fit.  
Overall, our fixed effects coefficient estimates are 
consistent across the five models. At the loan level, the 
coefficient estimate for ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) is negative 
and significant in Models 2A, 2C and 2E, while the 
coefficient for DaysLeftijt-1 is positive and significant in 
these three models. For lending team-related variables, 
the coefficient estimates for ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) and 
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1)  are positive and significant in 
Models 2A, 2C and 2E, indicating that having more 
contributing teams and having contributing teams with 
more members led to more funding received in the next 
week.  Contrary to our expectation, the coefficient for 
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) is negative and significant 
across all three models. This shows that having 
contributing teams with more dollar amount lent in the 
previous month resulted in less funding received during 
the next week. The inverse Mills ratio for controlling the 
team selection bias is negative and significant in all 
three models. 
At the field partner level, the coefficient estimate for 
PtrRatingjt-1 is negative and either significant or weakly 
significant in Models 2A, 2D and 2E. This contradicts 
H1c and indicates that loans with more risky field 
partners were able to obtain more funding during the 
next period. The coefficient estimate for ln(PtrTenurejt-
1) is positive and significant in Model 2A but not in 
Models 2D and 2E. The coefficient estimate for 
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1 +1) is negative across the three 
models but only significant or weakly significant in 
Models 2A and 2D. 
By comparing the deviances and the significance of 
the random coefficients of the models, we can see that 
adding the field partner level into the data analysis 
provides additional explanatory power beyond that 
provided by the loan-level variables or the fixed effects. 
Based on the results from the unconditional Model 2B, 
we calculate the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
(ICC) as σ2ξ0j / (σ2ξ0j + σ2ε) = 37%. This reveals that 37% 
of the total variation in ln(LoanAmtRcvdijt+1) can be 
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explained by the field partners. In Models 2C and 2E, 
the random coefficients for ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1), 
DaysLeftijt-1 and ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) are significant, 
while those for ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) are weakly 
significant. Hence, the impacts of these loan-level 
variables vary across field partners. Taken together, 
these results suggest the importance of incorporating the 
field partner as an additional level of analysis when 
examining loan contribution on Kiva. 
 
Table 4. Results of baseline and multilevel mixed-effects models 
 Model 2A 
(Baseline 
model) 
Multilevel Mixed Effects Models 
Model 2B 
(Intercepts 
only) 
Model 2C 
(Level 1 only) 
Model 2D 
(Level 2 only) 
Model 2E 
(Both Level 1 
and Level 2) 
Fixed effects 
Intercept (γ00) 1.2247*** 
(0.2296) 
4.8691*** 
(0.1404) 
2.5098*** 
(0.0917) 
8.8120*** 
(1.0667) 
3.5449*** 
(0.6581) 
ln(PtrTenurejt-1) (γ01) 0.1778*** 
(0.0366) 
  0.2823 
(0.2905) 
-0.0956 
(0.1337) 
ln(PtrTtlAmtRaisedjt-1+1) (γ02) -0.0178 
(0.0200) 
  -0.3595** 
(0.1413) 
0.0206 
(0.0720) 
PtrRatingjt-1 (γ03) -0.1493*** 
 (0.0170) 
  -0.3958*** 
(0.1327) 
-0.1763*** 
(0.0630) 
ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) (γ10) -0.3922*** 
(0.0092) 
 -0.3420*** 
(0.0130) 
 -0.3476*** 
(0.0135) 
DaysLeftijt-1 (γ20) 0.0459*** 
(0.0023) 
 0.02309*** 
(0.0031) 
 0.0271*** 
(0.0033) 
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) (γ30) 2.2992*** 
(0.0296) 
 2.0342*** 
(0.0363) 
 2.0222*** 
(0.0388) 
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) (γ40) 0.0385*** 
(0.0087) 
 0.0400*** 
(0.0091) 
 0.0384*** 
(0.0092) 
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) (γ50) -0.0792*** 
(0.0112) 
 -0.0678*** 
(0.0117) 
 -0.0683*** 
(0.0117) 
IMR i,t-1 (β6) -0.1918*** 
(0.0071) 
 -0.0977*** 
(0.0114) 
 -0.0928*** 
(0.0116) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Random effects 
Intercept (σ2ξ0j)  2.4856*** 
(0.3293) 
 
 
2.0397*** 
(0.2825) 
0.0501* 
(0.0331) 
ln(TtlAmtRcvdijt-1+1) (σ2ξ1j)   0.0066*** 
(0.0015) 
 0.0070*** 
(0.0016) 
DaysLeftijt-1 (σ2ξ2j)   0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
ln(NoTeamsijt-1+1) (σ2ξ3j)   0.0172** 
(0.0079) 
 0.0264*** 
(0.0108) 
ln(TtlTeamMbrsijt-1+1) (σ2ξ4j)   0.0003 
(0.0002) 
 0.0003 
(0.0003) 
ln(TtlTeamMoLoanijt-1+1) (σ2ξ5j)   0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
 0.0004* 
(0.0003) 
Residual (σ2ε)  4.2335*** 
(0.0281) 
2.9727*** 
(0.0296) 
4.2369*** 
(0.0282) 
2.9693*** 
(0.0300) 
N 20,596 45,434 20,779 45,211 20,596 
Deviance 812,162.7 195,072.7 82,030.3 194,144.5 81,318.4 
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
 
We perform four robustness checks on our data 
analysis. First, because we are unable to include the 
number of lenders as an independent variable due to 
its high correlation with the cumulative amount raised, 
we test additional models by replacing the cumulative 
amount raised with the number of lenders. We obtain 
very similar results to those report in Table 4 in terms 
of coefficient estimates and significance levels.  
Second, in addition to examining the impacts of 
the field partner and contributing teams on the amount 
of funding received, we also test additional models 
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using the percentage of the loan received during a 
week as the dependent variable and the cumulative 
percentage of loan received up to the previous week as 
one of the independent variables. We also obtain 
results very similar to those reported in Table 4.  
Third, we replaced the dummy variable indicating 
the presence of a field partner with three field partner 
statistics including tenure, amount of loan raised, and 
rating in the first-stage selection model to account for 
the impact of field partners on the likelihood of a loan 
having at least one lending team. Our results from the 
second-stage multilevel mixed-effects model have the 
same signs for the coefficient estimates with similar 
magnitudes and significance levels.  
Fourth, because 98.5% of our sample loans 
involved a field partner, we are unable to run a 
Heckman selection model on the field partner due to 
the lack of enough variation. A closer examination of 
the data shows that the lack of a field partner is for 
U.S. borrowers only. We do not consider this to be a 
serious issue for two reasons. First, the U.S. is the only 
developed country where Kiva lenders lend to. 
Because Kiva lenders do not get any interest on their 
loans to the borrowers and they primarily lend to 
borrowers in developing countries for altruistic 
reasons, loans from U.S. lenders may perform 
systematically different from those with borrowers in 
developing countries as the underlying drivers may be 
different. Second, our second-stage multilevel analysis 
accounts for the fixed loan effect where the impacts of 
loan-invariant variables such as goal amount, country 
and sector are controlled.  
 
6. Discussion  
 
6.1. Theoretical contribution 
 
We examine how two different types of 
transaction-based event-type social networks on P2P 
lending platform Kiva function differently as pipes 
and prisms to affect fundraising success. We have the 
following major results and contribution.  
First, we extend the crowdfunding literature by 
examining the impacts of event-type social networks. 
The extant crowdfunding literature has recognized the 
importance of borrowers’ and lenders’ social networks 
on crowdfunding success. However, the focus has 
been on more permanent state-type social networks 
such as friendship networks [4, 5]. In the current 
research, we study more temporary event-type ties that 
develop based on business transactions between the 
borrowers and field partners and between the 
borrowers and their contributing teams and the 
impacts of such event-type ties on crowdfunding. 
Second, our research contributes to the 
crowdfunding and social network literature by 
highlighting the different mechanisms through which 
social networks can influence crowdfunding success. 
While both borrower-partner and borrower-team 
networks are event-type networks, our theorizing and 
results show that the borrower-team networks function 
as pipes that facilitate the flow of information and 
prospective lenders from a lending team to the loan 
page, and borrower-partner ties serve as prisms that 
signal the pressing financial need of the borrowers.  
Third, our results reveal the importance of 
contributing teams to the success of a Kiva loan. 
Specifically, having a larger number of contributing 
teams and more members in these teams result in more 
contribution received in the next period. The fact that 
not only the total number of contributing teams but 
also the total number of members in these teams affect 
fundraising success also confirms our hypothesis that 
the borrower-team ties serve as pipes that funnel more 
prospective lenders from the contributing teams’ 
webpages to a loan’s webpage, build up awareness, 
and result in more fundraising success. The team 
webpage serves as an online community for Kiva 
lenders with similar lending interests, shared identity 
or affiliation, or close geographic proximity. 
Empirical research shows that online communities 
foster members’ identification with and commitment 
to the community and social media platform, thus 
resulting in more active member participation. On 
Kiva, members of a lending team can interact with 
each other through the team’s discussion forum, 
review other team members’ lending activities, and 
discover loans other team members have contributed 
to. This makes finding more information about a 
particular loan much easier given the large number of 
concurrent loans on Kiva. Contrary to our expectation, 
the total amount of contributing team loans in the last 
month is negatively correlated with a loan’s 
fundraising success. There are two possible 
explanations, First, this can be indicative of the limited 
financial resources available to Kiva lenders. As the 
lenders contribute more to other loans in the 
immediate past, they have less financial resource to 
lend to the current borrowers. Second, when team 
members contributed more in the last months, more 
loans will show on the team’s homepage, thus giving 
other team members more options to choose from. 
This intensified competition among loans may result 
in reduced loan contribution in the next period. 
Fourth, our research highlights a different 
mechanism through which the borrower-partner ties 
affect fundraising success. Contrary to our 
expectation, field partner rating is negatively 
correlated with loan success. This suggests that, while 
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lenders take the field partner’s risk rating into 
consideration in their lending decisions, they do not 
interpret it as a signal of the borrower(s)’ more 
desirable or trustworthy status. In contrast, a loan with 
a riskier field partner is perceived more favorably by 
lenders. We interpret this as another prism effect 
where altruistic lenders view more risky field partners 
as indicative of borrowers with more significant 
financial needs. Because Kiva lenders do not receive 
any interest on their loans and run the risk of not 
getting their loans back, they lend to borrowers from 
developing countries with the goal to help others 
rather than making a profit on their investment. As a 
result, the field partner’s risk rating is not factored 
negatively into the lenders’ decision making process. 
Fifth, we confirm a substitution effect observed in 
prior crowdfunding research where prospective 
lenders favor loans with less contribution [11] and 
observe that Kiva loans receive more contribution 
early in their fundraising process.  
Sixth, our multilevel mixed effects model results 
reveal the importance of considering the field partner 
as an additional level of analysis beyond the loan. 
Specifically, the field partner explains 37% of the total 
variation in the natural log of the loan contribution 
during a week. Moreover, there is significant variation 
in the impacts of loan-level variables such as the total 
contribution received, days left, the total number of 
contributing teams, and the amount of loan made by 
the contributing teams in the previous month among 
loans sponsored by different field partners. 
 
6.2. Practical implications 
 
Our research has the following implications for 
crowdfunding platforms in general and P2P lending 
providers in particular. First, our results highlight the 
importance of using lending teams to build 
communities of online lenders, encourage more active 
lender participation, and enhance fundraising success. 
Multiple studies have confirmed the significance of 
online communities in enhancing website stickiness. 
While many crowdfunding platforms allow users to 
post comments under a crowdfunding project, few 
supports online communities on their platforms. The 
project comment section only supports limited 
interaction among the users and requires them to first 
become aware of a particular fundraising project. In 
contrast, an online lending team on Kiva allows team 
members to post to the team’s discussion forum, 
interact with each other, and discover other 
fundraising loans. The sense of community and the 
commitment to the team and to Kiva will lead to more 
team member lending behavior.  
Second, our results suggest that, depending on the 
function and goal of a crowdfunding platform, the 
factors that affect lending behavior and crowdfunding 
success will be different. For example, contrary to our 
expectation, loans associated with more risky field 
partners are perceived more favorably by Kiva 
lenders. Hence, when designing crowdfunding 
platforms, the providers should consider the market 
they serve and the characteristics of their prospective 
lenders. For donation-based crowdfunding platform, 
the emphasis should be more on the emotional aspects 
of helping others and making a difference in their 
lives. In contrast, in profit-driven P2P lending or 
equity-based crowdfunding, the emphasis should be 
more on the return on investment and risks involved.  
Third, due to the prevalence of the substitution 
effect observed in multiple crowdfunding studies 
including the current one, crowdfunding platforms 
should consider strategies to enhance contribution to 
late-stage fundraising projects to ensure fundraising 
success. This is especially important for platforms 
employing the all-or-nothing model where borrowers 
do not receive anything if they do not reach the 
fundraising goal by the end of the fundraising period. 
Strategies that can be employed include listing more 
active and close to fundraising goal projects on the 
platform’s or each category/subcategory’s front page 
and engaging in email marketing campaigns alerting 
members of such projects.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The current research examines how two types of 
transaction-based event-type ties on Kiva contribute 
differently to crowdfunding success. Our empirical 
research using a multilevel mixed effects model 
reveals that borrower-team ties function as pipes that 
facilitate the flow of information and prospective 
lenders to a loan’s page, while borrower-partner ties 
serve as prisms that signal the urgency of the 
borrowers’ financial need.  
Our research has limitations. First, our results on 
two different types of event-type social networks are 
based on one P2P lending platform only. Future 
research can examine other event-type ties and how 
they affect crowdfunding success on other platforms. 
Second, while we observe the significance of the 
borrower-team and borrower-partner relationships to 
fundraising success on Kiva, we cannot infer causality 
as we do not test lenders’ decision making directly. We 
plan to conduct additional analyses on how the number 
of current lenders on a loan from one team affect the 
number of new lenders from the same team. Future 
research can verify the impacts of such ties using 
laboratory experiments. 
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